This paper hypothesizes that the interaction of changing economic incentives with hyperbolic discounting can help explain the increasing mean and variance of the body mass index (BMI) distribution. We present a model predicting that impatient individuals should both weigh more than patient individuals and experience sharper increases in weight in response to falling food prices. We then test these predictions using individuallevel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth matched with local food prices from the Council for Community and Economic Research. Both the beta and delta components of a quasi-hyperbolic discount function predict BMI and obesity even after controlling for demographic, human capital, occupational, and …nancial characteristics as well as risk preference. Obesity is therefore partly attributable to rational intertemporal tradeo¤s but also partly to time inconsistency. We then show that the interaction of present bias with local food price predicts BMI, with falling food prices leading to the largest weight gains among those exhibiting the greatest present bias. These results provide insight into why, in an environment of cheaper and more readily available food, increases in BMI appear to be concentrated amongst the right tail of the distribution rather than spread throughout the entire distribution.
Introduction
The US obesity rate has skyrocketed in recent decades, rising from 13% in 1960 to 34% in 2006 (Flegal et al., 1998; National Center of Health Statistics, 2008) . Obesity, de…ned as a body mass index (BMI) of at least 30, is both a public health and public …nance concern.
1 Adverse health conditions attributed to obesity, which include heart disease, diabetes, high blood pressure, and stroke, lead to an estimated 112,000 deaths per year (Strum, 2002; Flegal et al., 2005) . Treating obesity-related conditions costs an estimated $117 billion annually, with about half of these expenditures …nanced by Medicare and Medicaid (US Department of Health and Human Services, 2001; Finkelstein et al., 2003) .
A growing literature argues that changes in economic incentives have decreased the opportunity cost of eating and raised the opportunity cost of exercise, leading to an increase in population weight. Factors lowering the monetary or time costs of food consumption include falling real food prices (Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2002; Philipson and Posner, 2003; Chou et al., 2004; Lakdawalla et al., 2005; Goldman et al., 2010) , increased restaurant density (Chou et al., 2004; Rashad et al., 2006; Dunn, 2008; Currie et al., 2010; Anderson and Matsa, forthcoming) , and reduced preparation time for food consumed at home (Cutler et al., 2003) .
Reduced on-the-job-physical activity Philipson, 2002 and 2005; Philipson and Posner, 2003) , urban sprawl (Ewing et al., 2003; Frank et al., 2004; Eid et al., 2008, Zhao and Kaestner, 2010) and historically cheap gasoline (Courtemanche, forthcoming) are factors in ‡uencing the opportunity cost of physical activity.
2 Less is known, however, about the role of underlying preferences. This paper provides a theoretical and empirical investigation of the interplay between hyperbolic discounting, economic incentives, and BMI. We show that measures of both long-run patience and present bias predict BMI, and that individuals exhibiting 1 BMI = weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared. 2 Other economic factors linked to obesity include cigarette prices (Chou et al., 2004; Gruber and Frakes, 2006; Chou et al., 2006; Rashad et al., 2006; Baum, 2009; Nonnemaker et al., 2009; Courtemanche, 2009) , Walmart Supercenters (Courtemanche, 2011) , work hours (Courtemanche, 2009) , health insurance coverage (Bhattacharya et al. 2010) , the minimum wage (Meltzer and Chen, 2010) , and the unemployment rate (Ruhm, 2000 and 2005) . the greatest degree of present bias gain the most weight when food prices fall. The interaction between impulsivity and incentives provides a possible explanation for why, as shown in Figure 1 , the rise in population weight in recent decades has been concentrated amongst the right tail of the BMI distribution rather than spread evenly throughout the distribution.
Some prior research examines the link between time preference and BMI.
3 Komlos et al. (2004) hypothesize that people may have become less patient over time, contributing to the rise in obesity. They support this theory by illustrating a time-series relationship between obesity and both the savings rate and debt-to-income ratio in the US, and also by demonstrating that countries with low savings rates have higher obesity rates. Smith et al. (2005) proxy for time preferences with savings behavior and …nd some evidence of a connection to BMI using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). Zhang and Rashad (2007) estimate a link between time preference and BMI in two datasets, the small Roper Center
Obesity survey and the larger Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System. Their proxies for time preference are self-reported willpower in the former and desire but no e¤ort to lose weight in the latter. Chabris et al. (2008) …nd a relationship between impatience and BMI using a more direct measure of time preference, the discount rate computed from answers to questions on intertemporal trade-o¤s administered in a laboratory setting to 126 subjects from the Boston area. Ikeda et al. (2010) utilize direct time preference measures in a large Japanese survey and demonstrate that greater patience is negatively associated with BMI.
Even if time preference and BMI are related, if people have not become less patient over time, then time preferences alone cannot explain trends in BMI. Borghans and Golsteyn (2006) consider a number of proxies for time preference available in a Dutch dataset and …nd that the extent to which time preference and BMI are related depends heavily on the choice of proxy. They examine trends in some of their proxies and …nd no evidence that the rate of time preference has changed over time. In a meta-analysis of experimental and …eld studies on time preferences published from 1978 -2002 , Percoco and Nijkamp (2009 …nd no evidence of changing time preferences over the sample period. Simpson and Vuchinich (2000) demonstrate a high test-retest reliability for time preferences measured in lab experiments, and Meier and Sprenger (2010) …nd a similar high degree of stability for time preferences in a longitudinal …eld experiment. In both of these studies, the within-person stability of time preference was similar to those of personality traits, suggesting that time preference is also a relatively …xed factor over an individual's lifetime.
We build on the obesity literature in three ways. First, we utilize a large national dataset, the 2006 NLSY, which includes not only questions on body weight and hypothetical intertemporal trade-o¤s but also a rich array of other individual information. These data allow us to push further than prior research toward establishing that the estimated association between time preference and BMI is a ceteris paribus relationship rather than a spurious correlation.
We do this both by controlling for potential confounders and conducting falsi…cation tests.
Building up from a simple regression to a model that includes demographic characteristics, IQ, education, income, net worth, work hours, and risk preference demonstrates that greater impatience consistently increases BMI and that the coe¢ cient estimate is stable across speci…-cations. Female obesity is more signi…cantly related to present-bias and male obesity is more related to time-consistent impatience. The e¤ects are strongest for whites, and are accompanied by related e¤ects on the probabilities of being obese and severely obese. Falsi…cation tests …nd no evidence of a link between time preference and either height or health conditions that are less directly tied to eating and exercise.
Second, we examine, both theoretically and empirically, whether impatience and incentives interact in determining BMI. Even if underlying rates of time preference have not changed over time, impatience can still help to explain changes in the BMI distribution if patient and impatient people respond di¤erently to changing economic incentives. Individuals who are highly concerned about future health might never develop unhealthy eating habits regardless of how cheap and available food becomes, whereas those who are less interested in the future might be more responsive. We …nd evidence to support this hypothesis by matching the NLSY to local food price data from the Council for Community and Economic Research (C2ER). The interaction between impatience and incentives might help to explain why the BMI distribution has become more spread out over time (as shown in Figure 1 ), as opposed to merely shifting to the right.
Finally, we provide a preliminary attempt to disentangle whether the observed relationship between time preference and BMI represents rational intertemporal substitution or self-control problems, a distinction that has critical implications for policy. If people make eating and exercise decisions via time-inconsistent preferences, then lower food prices could actually decrease welfare, providing a justi…cation for policies designed to alter these decisions (Cutler et al., 2003) . If instead individuals make these decisions by rationally trading o¤ current and future consumption in a way that maximizes lifetime expected utility, then policies that alter eating and exercise could be socially wasteful even if they reduce population weight. We …t the NLSY's intertemporal tradeo¤s using the quasi-hyperbolic ( ) speci…cation, decomposing time preferences into a present-biased, time-inconsistent component and a time-consistent component. BMI is consistently associated with present-biased time-inconsistent discounting, suggesting that the observed e¤ect on BMI represents self-control problems rather than rational intertemporal substitution.
Theoretical Model
We present a simple theoretical model to highlight the interaction of impatience and incentives in weight accumulation. We demonstrate that more impatient individuals should display a greater response to decreasing food prices than patient individuals. We consider a modi…ed version of the Philipson and Posner (2003) and Lakdawalla and Philipson (2009) > 0. Note that assuming that food increases weight instantaneously as well as in the future period would not change our key comparative static result that more impatient individuals place less emphasis on future weight gain, and hence a greater sensitivity to declining food prices.
Consider an in…nitely lived consumer in discrete time with additively separable and stationary utility. Normalize the price of consumption to 1 and let p denote the relative price of food. A consumer begins with initial wealth I 0 ; which he can save at market interest rate r: Let denote the per-period discount factor, with 0 < < 1: A consumer chooses food f and other consumption c to maximize:
Letting V denote the value function yields the following Bellman equation:
s. t. :
The …rst-order conditions are thus:
which implies that at the optimum:
Note that if a person is underweight,
may be positive, which could happen at suf…ciently high food prices. However, individuals in our modern U.S. sample are presumably either at or above their ideal weight and therefore ; however, the weight cost of food occurs in the future and is therefore discounted by :
We now consider the relationship between patience, food consumption, and weight. Our …rst result is that more patient individuals consume less food and will have a lower weight.
That is, for a given p; if @V @W t+1 < 0; then as ! 1; f t declines. Greater patience has two e¤ects. First, in equation (5) are more pronounced for more patient individuals than for impatient individuals. As such, more patient individuals will purchase less additional food after a decrease in food prices than will impatient individuals,
The greater emphasis on future weight e¤ects causes patient individuals to display a dampened increase in food consumption in response to cheaper food compared to impatient individuals; alternatively, more impatient individuals should be more responsive to changes in food prices. Our data analysis tests these theoretical predictions.
Data
We test these theoretical predictions using data from the NLSY, a panel from the US Bureau of wait, you will receive more than $1000. What is the smallest amount of money in addition to the $1000 you would have to receive one year from now to convince you to wait rather than claim the prize now?"
We compute respondents'discount factors -which we name "Discount Factor 1" (DF 1)
-from their answers (amount1) as follows:
The second question is, "Suppose you have won a prize of $1000, which you can claim immediately. However, you can choose to wait one month to claim the prize. If you do wait, you will receive more than $1000. What is the smallest amount of money in addition to the $1000 you would have to receive one month from now to convince you to wait rather than claim the prize now?"
We use these answers (amount2) to compute annualized (via simple multiplication) discount factors -named "Discount Factor 2" (DF 2) -through the following formula:
We exploit the fact that the NLSY contains two intertemporal discounting questions, one over a monthly interval and the other over an annual interval, to compute a measure of present-bias. A time-consistent individual should have the same (annualized) discount factor over the monthly interval as the annual interval. By contrast, a present-biased individual will display decreasing impatience and have a greater discount factor for the annual delay than the monthly delay. We jointly …t an individual's responses to both intertemporal questions using the quasi-hyperbolic discounting speci…cation, whereby individuals discount outcomes periods away at : The parameter re ‡ects an individual's "long-run" level of patience, whereas re ‡ects any disproportionate weight given to the immediate present at the expense of all future periods (Phelps and Pollak, 1968; Laibson, 1997 ). If = 1; then quasihyperbolic discounting reduces to traditional, time-consistent discounting, whereas < 1 re ‡ects potentially time-inconsistent impulsivity and present-bias.
Assuming annual periods, an individuals'joint responses to these two questions imply : To assess the relative contribution of impulsivity versus impatience towards obesity, our main regressions include both and as regressors. As robustness checks, we explore the sensitivity of the results to the use of Discount Factor 1 or Discount Factor 2 as our measure of time preference. In unreported regressions, we also veri…ed that the conclusions reached are similar using discount rates instead of factors.
Some economists object that hypothetical questions, such as the ones above, provide no incentive for respondents to carefully assess the intertemporal trade-o¤ and thus may not be representative of individuals' true preferences. However, at least in the domain of time preferences, several studies have demonstrated no di¤erence in responses between real and hypothetical decisions (Johnson and Bickel, 2002; Madden et al., 2003) . Of studies demonstrating a di¤erence between real versus hypothetical time discounting decisions, Kirby and Marakovic (1995) found that subjects discounted real amounts more impatiently, whereas Coller and Williams (1999) found that respondents discounted real amounts more patiently.
Taken together, these studies suggest that there is no systematic bias between the temporal discounting of real versus hypothetical amounts.
Note that the above discount factor computations implicitly assume linear utility. We also utilize the answer to a 2006 NLSY question on risk preference as a control in order to address the possible concern that time and risk preference are correlated. This question is: "Suppose you have been given an item that is either worth nothing or worth $10,000. Tomorrow you will learn what it is worth. There is a 50-50 chance it will be worth $10,000 and a 50-50 chance it will be worth nothing. You can wait to …nd out how much the item is worth, or you can sell it before its value is determined. What is the lowest price that would lead you to sell the item now rather than waiting to see what it is worth?"
We also construct a set of control variables using the NLSY's information on age, race, gender, marital status, education, occupation, work hours, income, and net worth. As dependent variables in falsi…cation tests, we utilize binary variables re ‡ecting whether the respondents have arthritis, asthma, anemia, chronic kidney or bladder problems, chronic stomach problems, frequent colds, or frequent headaches. Table 1 lists these items while giving their average prices and weights. We also construct a non-food price variable by taking the weighted averages of the price indices for housing, utilities, transportation, health care, and miscellaneous goods and services. Tables 2 and 3 report the names, descriptions, means, and standard deviations of the variables used in the empirical analysis. The average BMI is 28.2; 38% of the sample is overweight but not obese, 20% is class I obese, and 12% is severely obese. The mean discount factor is 0.6 using the annual delay question and 0.4 using the monthly delay question, corresponding to a 66% and 150% annual interest rate. Though this degree of …nancial impatience may appear implausibly high, note that the NLSY questions explicitly establish receiving money immediately as the status quo. A robust …nding is that preferences are sticky towards a status quo option, and measuring patience via this willingness to delay methodology yields greater elicited impatience than methods which do not impose an immediate intertemporal reference point (Loewenstein, 1988; Shelley, 1993; McAlvanah, 2010) . The average respondent is more patient over longer delays, supportive of hyperbolic discounting or diminishing impatience.
The quasi-hyperbolic speci…cation implies that the average individual discounts any future outcome with equal to 0.80, and subsequent periods with discount factor of 0.75, or about 33% per year. The inclusion of implies a more patient level of annual discounting than the prior speci…cations. 85% of individuals have < 1, indicating that the vast majority of respondents are present-biased. Seven percent of respondents are exactly time-consistent with = 1, whereas eight percent of respondents are hyperopic and future-biased with > 1.
Empirical Analysis

Discount Factor and BMI, Overweight, and Obesity
We begin the empirical analysis by estimating the association between time preferences and BMI. Our main regression equation is
where i indexes individuals. The main parameters of interest are and , the computed measures of present-bias and long-run patience, respectively. DEMO is a set of demographic controls including age and indicators for gender, race, and marital status. HC is a set of variables re ‡ecting endowment of and investment in human capital; these include IQ (as measured by score on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test) and dummies for educational attainment.
LABOR is a set of controls for labor market activity, comprised of work hours and indicators for whether an individual's employment is blue-collar, white-collar, or service industry, relative to the omitted category of unemployment. FIN consists of the …nancial controls income and net worth, along with the square of income since prior research has documented an inverted U-shaped relationship between income and BMI (Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2002) .
Finally, RISK is the measure of risk preference. We include the sets of control variables in an e¤ort to isolate the ceteris paribus relationship between time preference and BMI. If levels of patience and BMI both di¤er systematically on the basis of age, gender, race, marital status, intelligence, education, income, net worth, time spent working, or risk preference, failing to adequately control for these variables may bias the estimators of 1 or 2 . Our model contains a more detailed set of covariates than prior studies examining the relationship between computed measures of time preference and BMI. Borghans and Golsteyn (2006) 5 We begin with a simple regression of BMI on discount factor and then gradually add the sets of controls to build up to the full model (6). As robustness checks, we also estimate (6) replacing and with the simple patience measures of DF 1 with DF 2. Table 4 reports the results, starting in column (1) with a regression with no control variables and gradually building up to the full model in column (6) in order to evaluate the robustness of the estimates. Both present-bias and long-run patience are statistically signi…cant and negatively associated with BMI in all six speci…cations, suggesting that impulsivity and time-consistent impatience are separately and signi…cantly associated with BMI.
Including the demographic and human capital controls in columns (2) and (3) attenuates the coe¢ cient estimate for somewhat, but across columns (3) to (6) the estimate stabilizes at -0.86 to -1 units. These estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in (decrease in impulsivity) of 0.2 lowers weight by 0.17 to 0.2 BMI units, or 1.11 to 1.29 pounds at the sample mean height of 67.3 inches. The coe¢ cient estimate for is stable across speci…ca-tions and ranges from -0.48 to -0.63. A standard deviation increase in (increase in long-run 5 We do not control for smoking in any of our speci…cations as smoking is related to time preference (Chabris et al., 2008) and also in ‡uences BMI (e.g. Chou et al., 2004) , creating the possibility for an over-controlling problem. Less obvious over-controlling problems could also exist for some of the variables we do include, such as education, work hours, income, and net worth. This highlights the importance of presenting results from a number of speci…cations with di¤erent combinations of control variables to ensure the estimates are stable. patience) of 0.33 therefore decreases weight by 0.16 to 0.21 BMI units, or 1.02 to 1.34 pounds at the sample mean height. Though we are of course unable to control for every potential confounding factor, the fact that the conclusions reached are not sensitive to the choice of covariates increases our con…dence that our results re ‡ect ceteris paribus relationships between and and BMI rather than spurious relationships driven by omitted variable bias.
Columns (7) and (8) of Table 4 report the results using discount factors computed from the annual and monthly delay questions, respectively, instead of the -approach. Discount factor is highly signi…cant in both regressions, with greater patience again indicating lower BMI. A standard deviation increase in discount factor decreases BMI by 0.25 units using DF 1 and 0.27 units using DF 2.
The results for the control variables are generally consistent with prior research. Being male, black, or married, not having a college degree, having a lower net worth, and working longer hours is associated with an increased BMI. Additional income is associated with a decrease in BMI but at a diminishing rate. Individuals working at relatively physically demanding blue collar and service jobs have lower BMIs than those working in white collar jobs or not working (the omitted category), though the di¤erences are either statistically insigni…cant or marginally signi…cant. Age, IQ, and risk preference are not statistically associated with BMI conditional on time preference and the other regressors. The lack of an e¤ect for age likely re ‡ects the limited age range in the sample. Table 5 displays the coe¢ cient estimates for and , splitting the sample by gender and race and using the full set of control variables. Table 5 also presents the results using a univariate measure of time preference, annual discount factor DF 1, as a robustness check.
Using DF 1 as the simple measure of time preference reveals that the e¤ect of discount factor on BMI is strong and signi…cant for men, and still negative but smaller and insigni…cant for women. However, decomposing time preferences reveals an interesting dichotomy between males and females. For females, the coe¢ cient on is negative and statistically signi…cant whereas is not signi…cant; the reverse pattern holds for males. This suggests that the rela-tionship between intertemporal preferences and BMI is driven by impulsivity and present bias and females, but time-consistent impatience for males. When stratifying by race, discount factor's impact is strong and signi…cant for whites but small and insigni…cant for non-whites.
Decomposing time preferences into and reveals that both and are negative and signi…cant for whites but insigni…cant for non-whites, though this is presumably attributable to the smaller non-white sample size.
We next estimate the association between discount factor and probability of being overweight, Class I obese, or severely obese using an ordered probit model. Since an increase in BMI is not harmful to health throughout the entire distribution and actually improves health at the far left tail, it is important to verify that weight gain caused by impatience is accompanied by increased odds of becoming overweight or obese. We estimate and is the cumulative distribution function for the standard normal distribution. Table 6 reports the estimates for 1 and 2 as well as the marginal e¤ects on the probabilities of being overweight, obese, or severely obese. and are each statistically signi…cant at the 10% level with negative coe¢ cient estimates, indicating that greater patience is associated with a lower BMI category. The marginal e¤ect of present bias on P(Overweight) is insigni…cant, though the marginal e¤ects on P(Class I Obese) and P(Severely Obese), however, are -0.026 and -0.031. These e¤ects are sizeable, representing 13% and 25% of the sample Class I obesity and severe obesity rates. Similar results hold using DF 1 as a robustness check. An increase in annual discount factor lowers BMI category at the 5% signi…cance level, and signi…cantly reduces the probabilities Class I Obese and Severely Obese.
We close this section with a series of falsi…cation tests. First, we re-estimate (8) using height in inches instead of BMI as the dependent variable. Since it is implausible that impatience a¤ects BMI by making people shorter rather than increasing their weight, such a …nding would call into question the validity of the identi…cation strategy. We then utilize as dependent variables chronic health conditions that are less directly the result of intertemporal choices than BMI. These conditions include arthritis or rheumatism; asthma; kidney or bladder problems; stomach, liver, intestinal, or gall bladder problems; anemia; frequent colds, sinus problems, hay fever, or allergies; and frequent or severe headaches, dizziness, or fainting spells. We also consider a dependent variable representing the total number of these conditions reported. These health problems are less clearly tied to eating and exercise than obesity, so any meaningful "e¤ect" of discount factor likely re ‡ects a mis-speci…ed model rather than a causal e¤ect. We estimate linear models for height, probit models for the individual health conditions, and a Poisson model for the total number of conditions. Table 7 reports the marginal e¤ects. Neither nor is ever signi…cant at the 5% level and is only signi…cant at the 10% level in one of the nine regressions. In unreported regressions, identical results hold using DF 1 as the measure of impatience. These results increase our con…dence that the …ndings for BMI are not the artifact of omitted variables correlated with patience and either health or stature. The falsi…cation tests also help alleviate concerns about reverse causality, as having a high BMI might decrease an individual's life expectancy and thereby cause her to optimize over a shorter time horizon. If this were the case, the measured discount factor should be correlated with all health problems regardless of whether they are the direct result of behaviors.
Interaction of Discount Factor and Food Prices
We next test the second prediction of the theoretical model and examine heterogeneity in the e¤ect of local food prices on BMI on the bases of impulsivity and long-run patience .
Food prices are perhaps the most obvious economic incentive related to body weight, and the decline in real food prices in recent decades is generally regarded as a contributing factor to the rise in obesity Philipson, 2002 and 2005; Philipson and Posner, 2003; Chou et al., 2004; Goldman et al., 2010) . Changing economic incentives such as falling food prices may explain the increase in the mean of the BMI distribution, but do not explain why the variance of the distribution has also increased. We hypothesize that changing incentives have interacted with individuals'levels of patience to both shift the BMI distribution to the right and thicken its right tail. Testing for e¤ects of the interactions of and with food prices provides a preliminary test of this theory.
The regression equation is similar to (8) but adds local food prices (P F OOD), non-food prices (P N F ), and the interaction of food prices with discount factor:
where c indexes counties.
6
Controlling for non-food prices helps ensure that the estimated e¤ects of food prices are not simply capturing a more general price e¤ect. The endogeneity of food prices is a natural concern. However, note that the regressors of interest in equation (10) are the interactions of food price with and , not food price itself. Even if the coe¢ cient estimator for food price is biased by unobservable market-level factors a¤ecting both food prices and weight, the estimator for the interaction term would only be biased if the e¤ect of these unobservables di¤ers systematically for people with di¤erent levels of patience and impulsivity. It is not obvious why this would be the case. Further, the natural direction of the bias in the estimator for food price is upward, as areas with high demand for food might have both higher food prices and higher body weights. However, we will still estimate an inverse relationship between food prices and BMI, so endogeneity bias is not preventing us from obtaining the signs predicted by economic theory.
7 Table 8 displays the results in a similar format as Table 4 , starting with a model with no controls and gradually building up to the full speci…cation in column (6). Columns (7) and (8) again experiment with the alternative discount factor measures. Table 9 contains some additional robustness checks. One potential concern is that the food basket used to compute market prices contains both healthy and unhealthy items, whereas the rise in obesity may be the result of cheaper junk food rather than lower across-the-board food prices. The …rst two columns of Table 9 therefore experiment with dropping the (arguably) healthier items from the food basket in an attempt to isolate the price of unhealthy food. The …rst column excludes the fruits and vegetables (lettuce, bananas, potatoes, peas, peaches, and corn). The second column also excludes the meats (steak, beef, chicken, sausage, eggs, tuna, and chicken frozen dinner), leaving only white bread, cereal, potato chips, and the three restaurant meals.
8
The third through …fth columns of Table 9 use 2-, 4-, and 6-year lags of food prices rather than contemporaneous prices to mitigate potential concerns about reverse causality [NOT YET DONE]. Finally, the last column of Table 9 adds interactions of food prices with all the other covariates in the model, addressing the possible concern that estimated heterogeneity by time preference might actually re ‡ect heterogeneity by characteristics that are correlated with time preference, such as income and education.
The coe¢ cient estimate for food price is negative across all 11 speci…cations in Tables   7 In unreported regressions, we also attempted a panel data speci…cation using the variation in city food prices over time. Due to the limited sample size, the …xed e¤ects speci…cation did not permit meaningful precision. 8 In an unreported regression we included separate variables for the prices of fruits/vegetables, meats, and other (unhealthy) foods, along with interactions of these three food prices with and . The coe¢ cient estimates for price and the interactions were both much larger for "other" foods than for fruits/vegetables and meats, suggesting that consumers'BMIs -and the BMIs of impatient consumers in particular -are most responsive to the prices of unhealthy foods. However, multicollinearity among the price variables prevented any of the price variables or interaction terms from being statistically signi…canct. We therefore consider these …ndings speculative and do not present them in the paper. 8 and 9 and signi…cant in 9. The interaction term P F OOD is signi…cant at the 5% level in all regressions and positively associated with BMI, supporting the prediction that greater impulsivity (lower ) strengthens individuals'response to food prices. The coe¢ cient estimates for the interaction term are all within a standard error of each other, ranging from 3.07 to 4.39. The interaction term P F OOD is also positively associated with BMI in all speci…cations, with coe¢ cient estimates ranging from 1.23 to 1.52. However, P F OOD is only signi…cant at the 10% level in one regressions, with the p-values in the others ranging from 0.11 to 0.19. The evidence regarding the interaction of long-run patience and food prices is therefore less conclusive than that for the interaction of impulsivity and food prices. In the speci…cations using discount factors instead of and (columns (7) and (8) of Table 8 ), the interaction terms are both signi…cant at the 5% level and suggest that greater impatience (lower DF 1 and DF 2) strengthens the food price e¤ect. BMIs than less impulsive ones. Figure 5 projects that if real food prices fall further in the future the gap between the two groups will widen even further.
Conclusion
This study investigates the connection between time preference, food prices, and BMI. We present a theoretical model predicting that greater impatience should both increase BMI and that impatient people should be more responsive to falling food prices. We then test these predictions using the 2006 NLSY matched with local price data from C2ER. Time preference is signi…cantly associated with BMI and the probabilities of being overweight and obese. The e¤ect of time preference on BMI is attributable to both present-biased, timeinconsistent preferences as well as time-consistent impatience, suggesting that both rational intertemporal substitution and impulsive behavior contribute to obesity. The interaction of time preferences and food prices reveals that present-biased individuals are more responsive to food prices, whereas no such e¤ect exists for time-consistent long-run impatience. This suggests that present-biased and impulsive individuals are predominantly responsive to food prices, whereas patient individuals are responsive to both food prices and health e¤ects. Our results potentially help to explain the rightward shift in the BMI distribution in recent decades as well as the most dramatic increase in the right tail. Future research should investigate whether other economic incentives besides food prices might also interact with individuals'
rates of time preference in determining weight. Additional research should continue to focus on the in ‡uence of self-control problems on weight and the corresponding policy implications. Obese ( Note: Obeservations are weighted using the NLSY sampling weights. Notes: n = 5982. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. *** statistically signi…cant at 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. Observations are weighted using the NLSY sampling weights. Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. *** statistically signi…cant at 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. Observations are weighted using the NLSY sampling weights. "Demographic" controls include age, gender, race, and marital status. "Human capital" controls include AFQT score and the education dummies. "Labor" controls include work hours and white collar, blue collar, and service indicators. "Financial" controls income, income 
